Writing in Wired Magazine, Bruce Schneier argues that most of the things we’ve been doing since 9/11 to try to secure the nation’s airlines have been a waste of time and money.
Since 9/11, our nation has been obsessed with air-travel security. Terrorist attacks from the air have been the threat that looms largest in Americans’ minds. As a result, we’ve wasted millions on misguided programs to separate the regular travelers from the suspected terrorists — money that could have been spent to actually make us safer.
The litany of what’s been tried is quite extensive, and the actual results they’ve produced quite limited.
Consider CAPPS and its replacement, Secure Flight. These are programs to check travelers against the 30,000 to 40,000 names on the government’s No-Fly list, and another 30,000 to 40,000 on its Selectee list.
The program has been a complete failure, resulting in exactly zero terrorists caught. And even worse, thousands (or more) have been denied the ability to fly, even though they’ve done nothing wrong. These denials fall into two categories: the “Ted Kennedy” problem (people who aren’t on the list but share a name with someone who is) and the “Cat Stevens” problem (people on the list who shouldn’t be). Even now, four years after 9/11, both these problems remain.
And even though CAPPS and Secure Flight have been a failure, the TSA has continued with other registered traveller programs which allow people to register in advance, supposedly pass a security screening and then bypass the normal security gates at airports. As Schneier says, the idea makes sense, but only for a short while:
Superficially, it all seems to make sense. Why waste precious time making Grandma Miriam from Brooklyn empty her purse when you can search Sharaf, a 26-year-old who arrived last month from Egypt and is traveling without luggage?
The reason is security. These programs are based on the dangerous myth that terrorists match a particular profile and that we can somehow pick terrorists out of a crowd if we only can identify everyone. That’s simply not true.
What these programs do is create two different access paths into the airport: high-security and low-security. The intent is to let only good guys take the low-security path and to force bad guys to take the high-security path, but it rarely works out that way. You have to assume that the bad guys will find a way to exploit the low-security path. Why couldn’t a terrorist just slip an altimeter-triggered explosive into the baggage of a registered traveler?
That is precisely what happened in the attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 when a terrorist planed a bomb disguised as a radio in luggage placed on a plane by a girlfriend. And these registered traveller programs have a more ominious side to them:
The truth is, Registered Traveler programs are not about security; they’re about convenience. The Clear program is a business: Those who can afford $80 per year can avoid long lines.
(…)
I think Verified Identity Pass understands this, and is encouraging use of its card everywhere: at sports arenas, power plants, even office buildings. This is just the sort of mission creep that moves us ever closer to a “show me your papers” society.
So, what has worked in making airline travel safer and what should we do to enhance that security ? Schneier has this suggestion:
Exactly two things have made airline travel safer since 9/11: reinforcement of cockpit doors, and passengers who now know that they may have to fight back. Everything else — Secure Flight and Trusted Traveler included — is security theater. We would all be a lot safer if, instead, we implemented enhanced baggage security — both ensuring that a passenger’s bags don’t fly unless he does, and explosives screening for all baggage — as well as background checks and increased screening for airport employees.
Meanwhile, the TSA is apparently considering relaxing its rules regarding the kind of sharp objects that passengers can take on board airplanes:
A new plan by the Transportation Security Administration would allow airline passengers to bring scissors and other sharp objects in their carry-on bags because the items no longer pose the greatest threat to airline security, according to sources familiar with the plans.
In a series of briefings this week, TSA Director Edmund S. “Kip” Hawley told aviation industry leaders that he plans to announce changes at airport security checkpoints that would allow scissors less than four inches long and tools, such as screwdrivers, less than seven inches long, according to people familiar with the TSA’s plans. These people spoke on condition of anonymity because the TSA intends to make the plans public Friday
Taken together, these two stories lead me to wonder if we really have any idea what we’re doing when it comes to airline security.
Linked with Don Surber and The Political Teen and Basil’s Blog and TMH’s Bacon Bits
